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演化博弈视角下企业低碳专利技术购买策略研究

Research on Enterprise Low Carbon Patent Technology Purchase Strategy from the Perspective of Evolutionary Game

Progress in Social Sciences / 2025,7(2): 133-143 / 2025-03-11 92 106

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• Authors: 徐浩     
• Information:

  西南石油大学经济管理学院，成都

• Keywords: 企业竞争；低碳技术专利；演化博弈；购买策略
• Enterprise competition; Low carbon technology patents; Evolutionary game; Purchasing strategy
• Abstract: 新常态经济发展阶段对我国低碳转型提出了新的挑战，客观上要求企业必须进行减排行为创新，由此催生了低碳专利技术的第三方授权模式。技术授权能够有效实现低碳减排技术从第三方快速流向行业内企业，降低企业的减排成本并促进技术进步。本文运用演化博弈理论，讨论了寡头企业是否购买低碳专利技术来降低生成成本从而提高企业竞争力的问题，研究发现当第三方机构低碳技术转让费较高时，不存在演化稳定点；当低碳技术转让费适中时，存在三个演化稳定点（1，0）、（0，1）、（1，1）；当专利转让费较低时，存在两个演化稳定点（0，0）、（1，1），此外，考虑存在一个强势企业，研究第三方机构的低碳技术授权费用对两家企业购买决策的影响。最后，根据均衡结果的演化趋势，给出相关管理启示。
• The new normal economic development stage poses new challenges to China’s low-carbon transformation, which objectively requires enterprises to innovate their emission reduction behaviors, thus giving birth to the thirdparty authorization of low-carbon patented technologies. Technology licensing can effectively realize the rapid flow of low-carbon emission reduction technologies from the third party to enterprises in the industry, reduce the emission reduction costs of enterprises and promote technological progress. Using evolutionary game theory, this paper discusses whether oligarchs buy low-carbon patented technology to reduce the generation cost and improve the competitiveness of enterprises. It is found that there is no evolutionary stable point when the transfer fee of low-carbon technology of third-party institutions is high; When the low-carbon technology transfer fee is appropriate, there are three evolutionary stable points (1,0), (1,1) and (1,1); When the patent transfer fee is low, there are two evolutionary stability points (0,0) and (1,1). In addition, considering the existence of a strong enterprise, this paper studies the impact of the low-carbon technology licensing fee of a third-party institution on the purchase decisions of the two enterprises. Finally, according to the evolution trend of equilibrium results, relevant management implications are given.
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.35534/pss.0702024
• Cite: 徐浩．演化博弈视角下企业低碳专利技术购买策略研究［J］．社会科学进展，2025，7（2）：133-143.