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博弈论视角下独立董事责任保险问题及其解决路径

The Problem of Independent Director Liability Insurance and its Solution from the Perspective of Game Theory

法学进展 / 2024,6(1)：38-50 / 2024-03-07 180 212

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• 作者： 周轩锐     
• 单位：

  上海政法学院，上海

• 关键词： 公司治理；独立董事；内部控制人；责任保险；博弈论
• Corporate governance; Independent director; Internal controller; Liability insurance; Game theory
• 摘要： 由于我国公司股东权力过于集中，仅引入独立董事制度难以改变公司运行结构、撼动公司内部控制人的权威。独立董事缺少相关的激励机制和监督机制，势力单薄最终沦为了控制人的附庸。为了改变这一现状，配套的独立董事责任保险或许是更优路径，通过外部治理机制改善公司内部治理问题，既不会受到公司内部权力不平衡的影响，保持监督者的独立性，又能通过处罚措施激励公司，成为独立董事制度生效的催化剂。博弈论将公司治理运作模式简化成多个主体的博弈过程，能够更直观地反映出独立董事责任保险在独立董事制度运行中发挥作用，使保险公司能够对独立董事的履职情况形成一种外部的监督，在诉讼中保护独立董事的合法权益并为相关利益人分担一定的风险。
• Because the rights of shareholders in Chinese companies are tooconcentrated, it is difficult to change the operating structure of companies andshake the authority of internal controllers by introducing independent directorsystem only. Independent directors lack the relevant incentive mechanism andsupervision mechanism, and their weak power eventually becomes a vassal ofthe controller. In order to change this situation, the supporting independentdirector liability insurance may be a better path: to improve the internal governance of the company through the external governance mechanism,which will not be affected by the power imbalance within the company andmaintain the independence of supervisors; It can also stimulate the companythrough punishment measures and become the catalyst for the effective ofthe independent director system. Game theory simplifies the operation modeof corporate governance into a game process of multiple subjects, which canmore intuitively reflect the role of independent director liability insurancein the operation of independent director system: Insurance companies canform an external supervision on the performance of independent directors;The insurance company can protect the legitimate rights and interests ofindependent directors in litigation; Insurance can share certain risks withrelevant stakeholders.
• DOI： https://doi.org/10.35534/al.0601004
• 引用： 周轩锐．博弈论视角下独立董事责任保险问题及其解决路径［J］．法学进展，2024，6（1）：38-50.